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Gender Bias Practice in
Pennsylvania’s Family Courts
by Kevin Sheahen, P.E..
Presented to Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court Committee on Racial and
Gender Bias in the Justice System on February 13, 2001
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I would like to thank the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System for inviting me
to testify at this hearing. Public
hearings give the judicial branch of our Commonwealth the opportunity to hear
the public testify about their perception of the effects of orders, rules and
statutory interpretation. Ideally this
allows you to correct misconceptions.
I am the local chapter president of National Congress
for Fathers and Children (NCFC) in Pittsburgh; a board of director’s member at
the national level of NCFC, and most importantly, a husband and the father of
four children. As a volunteer I help
fathers get access to their children on a daily basis so the children have real
full time and responsible fathers. I
personally assist upwards to 400 fathers a year with their problems with
Pennsylvania’s system, which too often fails to enforce children’s access to their
non-custodial parents. I have been active
in the education of father’s rights to the public for the past seven
years. NCFC’s emphasis is and always
has been to promote responsible fatherhood by encouraging fathers to be
actively involved, as well as being financially responsible. However, dollars alone do not make
”daddies”.
The purpose of my testimony is to bring to this
committee’s attention that the Pennsylvania Justice System practices gender
bias and discrimination in the area of custody determination and custody
enforcement.
The first question then, is where is the source of
the bias against fathers in domestic relations? Such bias is generally acknowledged by the public and is often
privately acknowledged by court officials.
Is this bias created by the statutes?
If it is, then I should be presenting this testimony to the Pennsylvania
Legislature instead of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court Committee on Racial and
Gender Bias in the Justice System.
Therefore, let us take a moment and review the statutes regarding
custody.
Pennsylvania’s custody statutes are gender neutral
and support parental involvement by both parents. As stated in the Title 23, Chapter 5301:
“. . . it is public policy of this Commonwealth,
when in the best interests of the child, to assure a reasonable and continuing
contact of the child with both parents after a separation or dissolution of the
marriage and the sharing of the rights and responsibilities of child rearing by
both parents . . .”.
Similarly in Chapter 5303 (a) provides: Award of
custody, partial custody or visitation; General Rule:
“In making an order for custody, partial custody or
visitation to either parent, the court shall consider, among other factors,
which parent is more likely to encourage, permit and allow frequent and
continuing contact and physical access between the noncustodial parent and the
child.”
Pennsylvania further has recently defined how much
time the non-custodial parent should be spending with his or her children. Pennsylvania’s support guidelines can be
found in Pennsylvania’s Rules of Court, Rule 1910.16-4; Explanatory
Comment-1998.
“. . . the Committee (Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Domestic Relations Committee) has designated 30% time as the routine
arrangement (for non-custodial parents with their children) . . .”.
Therefore, on paper, Pennsylvania’s statutes on
custody issues are fairly gender neutral and promote substantial parental
involvement by noncustodial parents. However, that is where justice ends.
The “tender years doctrine” was removed from the
statutes over twenty years ago and replaced with the “best interests of the
child” standard. However, there is
little practical distinction in the application of the two standards by the
Pennsylvania courts. The Courts have
relatively low expectations regarding the role of fathers in child rearing and
the nearly fanatical mythologies surrounding women’s roles in child care. Pennsylvania courts use psychological
evaluations to determine and measure parental fitness at great financial cost
to the parties, usually the fathers. The problem is that there are no valid or reliable scientific
tests in the psychological community to measure parental fitness. The results are subjective and bias reports
and recommendations regarding “best interests of the child”. These professionals, judges included,
display a confirmatory bias that skews their decisions and recommendations to
fit a preconceived hypothesis. In
addition, the majority of parents are “base rate” parents and the courts and
their related professionals will attempt to find something abnormal with normal
parenting behavior. A base rate parent
is a parent who has normal parenting skills and does not have any convictions
of child abuse or some of the violent and deviant crimes listed in the
statutes. Most parents, probably 98%,
are base rate parents.
Every person in this room and in this Commonwealth
knows that children are improperly denied and limited access to their fathers
in cases of divorce and birth out of wedlock.
Over 80% of the time primary custody of minor children is awarded to
mothers while fathers are limited to partial custody or nominal
visitation. Fathers are awarded primary
custody less than 10% of the time.
While shared physical custody is rarely ordered by the courts of
Pennsylvania, parents consent to shared custody a little less than 10% of the
time. Such agreements are made in spite
of the financial disadvantage to mothers that result, because a few responsible
parents want what is best for their children.
80% of cases are decided in favor of one gender. Women recognize this judicial bias and look
to Pennsylvania judges to grant the mother primary custody and control of the
minor children. Undoubtedly, this
explains why women file for divorce about 70% of the time when minor children
are involved and about half of the time otherwise. Why is this bias and discrimination ignored and brushed under the
rug in the United States of America in the year 2001?
This phenomenon inspired what is probably the first
paper in the American Journal of Law and Economics ever to be named after a
Nancy Sinatra song. In "These Boots Are Made for Walking: Why Most
Divorce Filers Are Women," Margaret F. Brinig and Douglas Allen found
that the primary reason for filing for divorce is to obtain primary custody of
the children.
- 67 to 75% of all
divorces are initiated by the female partner: 74 to 80% of unilateral
(non-mutual) divorces. (Percentages vary only slightly from the US to
Australia to Germany).
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[Maggie Gallagher, The
Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love, Washington, DC: Regnery,
1996, who cites Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. and Andrew J. Cherlin, Divided
Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part, Harvard University
Press, 1991, p. 22. Ilene Wolcott and Jody Hughes, "Towards Understanding
the Reasons for Divorce," Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family
Studies, Working Paper No. 20, June 1999, as quoted in The Australian, 5 July
1999. Beuhler, "Whose Decision Was It?" Journal of Marriage and
the Family, Vol. 48, pp 587 - 595, 1987. Braver & O'Connell, Divorced
Dads, Tarcher Putnam, 1998, p. 34. Lynn Gigy & Joan Kelly, "Reasons
for Divorce: Perspectives of Divorcing Men and Women," Journal of
Divorce and Remarriage, Vol. 18, 1992. Braver, Whitley, Ng, "Who
Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Issues," Journal of
Divorce and Remarriage, Vol. 20, 1993. ]
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"Some women file for divorce because they're
exploited in really bad marriages," said Dr. Brinig, a professor of law at
the University of Iowa. "But it seems to be a relatively small number,
probably less
than 20 percent of the cases."
The solution to the mystery, the factor that
determined most cases, turned out to be the question of child custody. Women
are much more willing to split up because -- unlike men -- they typically do
not
fear losing custody of the children. Instead, a divorce often enables them to
gain control over the children.
"The question of custody
absolutely swamps all the other variables,” Dr. Brinig said. "Children are
the most important asset in a marriage, and the partner who expects to get sole
custody is by far the most
likely to file for divorce."
The correlation with custody is so strong, Dr.
Brinig said, that she has changed her view about the best way to preserve
marriages and protect children. She previously advocated an end to quick
no-fault divorces, but now believes that the key is to rewrite custody laws.
The statistical disparity in custody awards in
Pennsylvania constitutes prima facia proof of discrimination. Institutionalized discrimination has an
extremely depressing effect on its victims.
For example, when racial discrimination was rampant African-American men
were given harder words to spell and more difficult tests to take before they
were allowed to register to vote. White
men were given far simpler tests before they registered to vote. As a result, a higher percentage of
African-Americans were denied the opportunity to vote. Countless African-Americans did not even
bother to try to vote because of the difficulties they encountered.
The same type of prima facia discrimination toward
children’s time with their fathers is occurring today in Pennsylvania. In an untold number of cases, perceptions of
gender bias discourage fathers from seeking custody. The fathers who do try to get more than every other weekend have
only a 10% chance of receiving more than the standard of every other weekend
with their children.
The family courts of Pennsylvania, both at the
trial and appellate levels, do not apply the statutes for the amount of
parental contact between the non-custodial parent and the child. Instead, Pennsylvania courts routinely award
only every other weekend, or 15% of available time between the non-custodial
parent asserting by implication and contrary to our statutes, that nominal contact
is in the best interests of children.
The Common Pleas courts and the Superior Court call such limited access
“liberal visitation”. The Pennsylvania
courts do not seem to understand the critically important contribution fathers
provide to children and their healthy psychological development. Similarly, fathers are often criticized for
the personal sacrifices they make on behalf of their families. They often sacrifice their health working
overtime or at two jobs in order to keep up with the financial needs and
demands of the family. Ironically,
their personal sacrifice on behalf of their children during the marriage is
often criticized and then used to restrict their time with their children after
their divorce.
The applied “best interest” standard also fails
miserably by awarding 85% of all custody time with the children to one
parent. This custodial parent, which is
overwhelmingly the mother is now in a position following divorce where she must
work full-time to meet her own expenses plus perform 100% of the routine daily
functions required to care for the children full-time. Her only respite is the children going to
father’s home two weekends per month.
In the meantime, father is an idle resource because the court custody
schedule does not allow him to interact with the children outside of the every
other weekend schedule. Lost is
father’s involvement in the routine school days, homework, and extracurricular
activities that are the significant activities in any child’s life.
Pennsylvania’s courts do not enforce Title 23,
Chapter 5303, which relates to cooperation and willingness to provide access of
the children to the non-custodial parent.
To illustrate the extent to which courts routinely ignore this statutory
mandate, one father was awarded custody of his two girls only after he filed
twenty-two contempt of custody petitions against the mother for refusing to
obey the custody order.
The term “visitation” is used both by the public
and by the courts when defining the time a non-custodial parent is with his or
her child. This term “visitation”
degrades the critically important contribution both parents provide to their
children’s psychological welfare. Use
of such an emotionally charged term is a form of discrimination to the non-custodial
parent. It also is not what the statute
definition of visitation implies.
Visitation, as defined by Pennsylvania’s statute, is ”the right to
visit a child. The term does not
include the right to remove a child from the custodial parent’s control”
The courts should be using the proper definitions, such as partial custody or
shared custody. In recognition of the
powerful nature of derogatory terms, especially when used to stereotype and
demean classes of individuals who are the victims of discrimination, many
states have substituted the term “parenting time” in order to impress on the
courts that children want, need, and deserve a meaningful relationship with
both parents.
Shared custody in Pennsylvania is rarely ordered by
the court. The Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County has created a “Catch-22” for fathers seeking shared
custody. Allegheny County former
Administrative Family Division Judge stated and adopted policies which denies
shared custody to fathers who request it from the court because in the court’s
opinion, this means they cannot cooperate with the mother. Ironically, fathers
cannot have shared custody if they do not request it. NCFC has labeled this the “Baer Bind”, in honor of the previous
Allegheny County Family Division Administrative Judge, Max Baer.
Pennsylvania courts bias against fathers is further
evidenced in the enforcement of custody.
Fathers pay 90% of child support payments to mothers while receive less
than 10% of support order payments.
Pennsylvania has a single statutory provision for enforcing contempt of
the courts orders for child support and custody. However, Pennsylvania’s practice in failing to enforce its
custody orders is reminiscent of the discriminatory doctrine criticized in Brown
vs. Board of Education. The Board
of Education claimed black children had separate but equal educational
facilities. Pennsylvania has a special
department in Harrisburg to collect support.
Allegheny County hired five new officers and dedicated squad cars to
arrest delinquent parents who fail to pay child support. What comparable resources do noncustodial
parents have to enforce custody? Very
little financial assistance is available for custody enforcement. In fact, enforcement funding is 1000 to 1 in
favor of child support collection according to Warren Farrell, Ph.D., in his
recent book, Father and Child Reunion.
Do some mothers deny access to fathers? Of course some mothers do deny access. Unfortunately, there are no enforcement
practices comparable to the enforcement zeal shown against fathers in support
issues. The following statistics
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of custody enforcement by the family courts.
- Two years after
divorce, 51% of children in sole mother custody homes only see their
father once or twice a year, or never.
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[Guidubaldi, 1989;
Guidubaldi, 1988; Guidubaldi, Perry, & Nastasi, 1987.]
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- 42% of fathers fail
to see their children at all after divorce
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[Frank F. Furstenberg,
Jr. and Christine Winguist Nord, "Parenting Apart," Journal of
Marriage and the Family, Vol. 47, No. 4, Nov., 1985.].
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- 90% of father
disengagement is caused by obstruction of access by a custodial parent
anxious to break the father-child ties.
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[Kruk, 1992, cited by
Prof. John Guidubaldi in his Minority Report and Policy Recommendations of
the US Commission on Child & Family Welfare, US Code Citation: 42 USC
12301, 1996. The same cause had been identified by Braver, Wolchik, &
Sandler, 1985, without an incidence rate.]
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- 70% of fathers felt
that they had too little time with their children. Very few of the
children were satisfied with the amount of contact with their fathers
after divorce.
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[Mary Ann Kock &
Carol Lowery, "Visitation and the Noncustodial Father," Journal of
Divorce, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 54.]
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- 42% of adult children
of divorce report their mother tried to keep them from seeing their
father, 25% to 40% of mothers admit to this, up to 75% of fathers report
it. Twice the non-compliance with court-ordered child support.
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[Cathy Young, Ceasefire!
Free Press, 1999, p. 209, who cites five studies for these figures.]
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- 40% of custodial
mothers self-report interfering with visitation to punish the father.
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[Braver et al p. 449,
"Frequency of Visitation by Divorced Fathers; Differences in Reports by
Fathers and Mothers.", American. Journal of Orthopsychiatry,
1991. col. II, lines 3-6.]
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- "90% of divorced
fathers have less than full access to their children."
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[Jonathan M. Honeycutt,
Ph.D.(c), M.P.A., I.P.C. Director of Research, Clinical & Consulting
Psychotherapist, National Institute for Divorce Research, Panama City,
Florida.]
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- 37.9% of fathers have
no access or visitation rights.
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[Census Bureau P-60,
#173, Sept 1991, p. 6, col. II, para. 6, lines 4 & 5.]
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- The former spouse
(mother) was the greatest obstacle to more frequent contact with the
children.
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[James Dudley,
"Increasing Our Understanding of Fathers who Have Infrequent Contact
with their Children," Family Relations, Vol. 4, p. 281, July 1991.]
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In a recent decision, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court penalized the father with attorney fees when he appealed a decision by
the Common Pleas Court that changed the existing vacation custody order. The Mother had submitted her vacation
schedule in conflict with the father’s vacation schedule and in conflict with
the court order for the second year in a row.
The father asked the court to confirm the existing custody order like
they did the previous year. The lower
court judge changed both party’s vacation schedules. The father appealed to the Superior Court as the order in its
present state rewarded the mother to ignore the existing vacation order. The Superior Court upheld the lower court’s
decision and penalized the father with attorney fee sanctions for trying to get
the existing order enforced.
The custody determination by the court in a
contested case is too long of a process when compared to the establishment of a
support order in Pennsylvania. The
children can lose the closeness with their father during this litigation
process. A support order can be set and
in place within a two to three month time frame. Custody, on the other hand, will take six months to twenty-four
months in a contested case. Sometimes,
during this litigation process, the children may be denied seeing their fathers
completely by the mother with the court being powerless to prevent this family
bond disintegration.
Ohio and Indiana will press both parents at the
time of the support hearings to establish a custody schedule. Pennsylvania will wait months and sometimes
over a year before establishing some custody orders. This is unfair to children and to their fathers. This delay is also unnecessary.
Suggested Remedies
The following recommendations to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court can be initiated without any changes to the existing
statutes. These recommendations are all
within the power of this branch of state government. These recommendations should be implemented immediately.
Custody Orders
1.
Assume that both parents are base rate parents unless documented
evidence proves the contrary.
2.
Adopt a standardized custody order which awards 30% of overnight stays
to the non-custodial parent. The
standardized order should be adopted as the presumptive minimum partial custody
schedule which is in the best interest of children.
3.
Encourage more judges to follow Title 23; Chapter 5306 by ordering the
parents to submit parenting plans to the Court. Evaluate the plans submitted by the parents to ascertain which
parent’s plan follows Chapter 5303 and allows more contact between the child
and the non-custodial parent as an important factor in determining custody.
4.
Establish an interim or final custody order before or simultaneously as
the support order is issued.
5.
Do not order psychological evaluations unless there is documented
evidence of mental instability on the part of either parent.
6.
Cease calling partial custody and shared custody “visitation”. Visitation is for criminals.
7.
Require educational organizations to educate parents on the various
aspects of parenting plans, mediation, existing statutes and effect of various
custody arrangements on children, including the overwhelming evidence that
joint custody minimizes the psychological damage caused to children by divorce.
Custody Enforcement
1.
Establish a custody enforcement department with comparable funding and
jurisdiction of the support enforcement department.
2.
Implement enforcement penalties quickly against the parent disobeying
the custody order, with each violation subject to an increased penalty.
3.
Adopt a presumption that custody should be reversed when access to the
children is continually and willfully denied.
The beneficiaries of eliminating gender
discrimination are the children and grandchildren, not to mention the enormous
benefits to society. Fathers would
benefit by being recognized as parents instead of visitors and being treated as
mere wallets. Society would benefit by
having more children raised by two parents. Child support collections would
increase because fathers would become more connected with their children, as
documented by every study on non-custodial parents access and involvement after
separation.
The practice of Pennsylvania’s Common Pleas Courts,
Superior Court and Supreme Court does not correspond to the present statutes
passed by the Commonwealth’s legislature.
If Pennsylvania wants to end its long history of discrimination against
fathers in domestic relations it must discontinue disenfranchising and
marginalizing fathers. Having adopted
the best interest of the child standard, we must let go of the institutionalized
practices which give lip service to gender neutrality and continues to apply
the tender years doctrine in practice.
A more enlightened future generation will compare the pervasive domestic
relation practices in Pennsylvania to the Jim Crow laws and practices in the
south after the Civil War. Surely it is
time the Pennsylvania courts stop flying the Confederate flag of sole mother
custody and eliminate gender bias in domestic relations.
Kevin Sheahen, P.E.
Chapter President
National Secretary
Right to Know Your Child’s Educational Records
In the situation where the custodial parent or the
school of your children is denying you access to the school records, threaten
the School Board with termination of any Federal Funding it may be receiving,
directly or indirectly. The full current text of what used to be called FERPA
(Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act) is reproduced below. The purpose
of FERPA was to punish school districts for exactly the behavior described at
the beginning of this article. It doesn’t even require a massive lawsuit. All
it takes is one phone call to the appropriate FERPA administrative office in
Washington, DC.
When you threaten the school board, suggest that
they consult with the attorney for the district on the ramifications of that
principal’s continuing violation of 20 U.S. Code Section 1232(g) reproduced
below.
Title 20, United States Code
Sec. 1232g. Family educational and privacy rights
(a) Conditions
for availability of funds to educational agencies or institutions; inspection
and review of education records; specific information to be made available;
procedure for access to education records; reasonableness of time for such
access; hearings; written explanations by parents; definitions
(1)(A) No funds shall be made available under
any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a
policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who
are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such
institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the education
records of their children. If any material or document in the education record
of a student includes information on more than one student, the parents of one
of such students shall have the right to inspect and review only such part of
such material or document as relates to such student or to be informed of the
specific information contained in such part of such material. Each educational
agency or institution shall establish appropriate procedures for the granting
of a request by parents for access to the education records of their children
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days
after the request has been made.
(B) No funds under any applicable program shall be
made available to any State educational agency (whether or not that agency is
an educational agency or institution under this section) that has a policy of
denying, or effectively prevents, the parents of students the right to inspect
and review the education records maintained by the State educational agency on
their children who are or have been in attendance at any school of an
educational agency or institution that is subject to the provisions of this
section.
(C) The first sentence of subparagraph (A) shall
not operate to make available to students in institutions of postsecondary
education the following materials:
(i) financial records of the parents of the
student or any information contained therein;
(ii) confidential letters and statements of
recommendation, which were placed in the education records prior to January 1,
1975, if such letters or statements are not used for purposes other than those
for which they were specifically intended;
(iii) if the student has signed a waiver of the student’s
right of access under this subsection in accordance with subparagraph
(D),
confidential recommendations -
(I) respecting admission to any educational
agency or institution,
(II) respecting an application for employment,
and
(III) respecting the receipt of an honor or
honorary recognition.
(E) A student or a person applying for
admission may waive his right of access to confidential statements described in
clause
(iii) of subparagraph (C), except that such waiver
shall apply to recommendations only if (i) the student is, upon request,
notified of the names of all persons making confidential recommendations and
(ii) such recommendations are used solely for the purpose for which they were
specifically intended. Such waivers may not be required as a condition for
admission to, receipt of financial aid from, or receipt of any other services
or benefits from such agency or institution.
(2) No funds shall be made available under any
applicable program to any educational agency or institution unless the parents
of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at
such institution are provided an opportunity for a hearing by such agency or
institution, in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, to challenge the
content of such student’s education records, in order to insure that the
records are not inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the
privacy rights of students, and to provide an opportunity for the correction or
deletion of any such inaccurate, misleading or otherwise inappropriate data
contained therein and to insert into such records a written explanation of the
parents respecting the content of such records.
(3) For the purposes of this section the term
“educational agency or institution” means any public or private agency or
institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program.
(4)(A) For the purposes of this section, the term
“education records” means, except as may be provided otherwise in subparagraph
(B), those records, files, documents, and other materials which -
(i) contain information directly related to a
student; and
(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.
(B) The term “education records” does not
include -
(i) records of instructional, supervisory, and
administrative personnel and educational personnel ancillary thereto which are
in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are not accessible or
revealed to any other person except a substitute;
(ii) records maintained by a law enforcement
unit of the educational agency or institution that were created by that law
enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement;
(iii) in the case of persons who are employed by
an educational agency or institution but who are not in attendance at such
agency or institution, records made and maintained in the normal course of
business which relate exclusively to such person in that person’s capacity as
an employee and are not available for use for any other purpose; or
(iv) records on a student who is eighteen years
of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education,
which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or
other recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or
paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made,
maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the
student, and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such
treatment, except that such records can be personally reviewed by a physician
or other appropriate professional of the student’s choice.
(5)(A) For the purposes of
this section the term “directory information” relating to a student includes
the following: the student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place
of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized
activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of
attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous
educational agency or institution attended by the student.
(B) Any educational agency or
institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the
categories of information which it has designated as such information with
respect to each student attending the institution or agency and shall allow a
reasonable period of time after such notice has been given for a parent to
inform the institution or agency that any or all of the information designated
should not be released without the parent’s prior consent.
(6) For the purposes of this
section, the term “student” includes any person with respect to whom an
educational agency or institution maintains education records or personally
identifiable information, but does not include a person who has not been in
attendance at such agency or institution.
(b) Release of education records; parental
consent requirement; exceptions; compliance with judicial orders and subpoenas;
audit and evaluation of federally-supported education programs; recordkeeping
(1) No funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution
which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records
(or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory
information, as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of this section) of
students without the written consent of their parents to any individual,
agency, or organization, other than to the following -
(A) other school officials,
including teachers within the educational institution or local educational
agency, who have been determined by such agency or institution to have
legitimate educational interests, including the educational interests of the
child for whom consent would otherwise be required;
(B) officials of other schools or
school systems in which the student seeks or intends to enroll, upon condition
that the student’s parents be notified of the transfer, receive a copy of the
record if desired, and have an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the
content of the record;
(C) authorized representatives of (i) the
Comptroller General of the United States, (ii) the Secretary, or (iii) State
educational authorities, under the conditions set forth in paragraph (3) of
this subsection;
(D) in connection with a student’s application
for, or receipt of, financial aid;
(E) State and local officials or authorities to
whom such information is specifically allowed to be reported or disclosed
pursuant to State statute adopted -
(i) before November 19, 1974, if the allowed
reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and such system’s
ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released, or
(ii) after November 19, 1974, if -
(I) the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns
the juvenile justice system and such system’s ability to effectively serve,
prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released; and
(II) the officials and authorities to whom such
information is disclosed certify in writing to the educational agency or
institution that the information will not be disclosed to any other party
except as provided under State law without the prior written consent of the
parent of the student. (FOOT NOTE 1)
(F) organizations conducting studies for, or on
behalf of, educational agencies or institutions for the purpose of developing,
validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid
programs, and improving instruction, if such studies are conducted in such a
manner as will not permit the personal identification of students and their
parents by persons other than representatives of such organizations and such
information will be destroyed when no longer needed for the purpose for which
it is conducted;
(G) accrediting organizations in order to carry
out their accrediting functions;
(H) parents of a dependent student of such
parents, as defined in section 152 of title 26;
(I) subject to regulations of the Secretary, in
connection with an emergency, appropriate persons if the knowledge of such
information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or
other persons; and (J)(i) the entity or persons designated in a Federal grand
jury subpoena, in which case the court shall order, for good cause shown, the
educational agency or institution (and any officer, director, employee, agent,
or attorney for such agency or institution) on which the subpoena is served, to
not disclose to any person the existence or contents of the subpoena or any
information furnished to the grand jury in response to the subpoena; and
(ii) the entity or persons designated in any other
subpoena issued for a law enforcement purpose, in which case the court or other
issuing agency may order, for good cause shown, the educational agency or
institution (and any officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney for such
agency or institution) on which the subpoena is served, to not disclose to any
person the existence or contents of the subpoena or any information furnished
in response to the subpoena. Nothing in clause (E) of this paragraph shall
prevent a State from further limiting the number or type of State or local
officials who will continue to have access thereunder.
(2) No funds shall be made available under any
applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy
or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable
information in education records other than directory information, or as is permitted
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, unless -
(A) there is written consent from the student’s
parents specifying records to be released, the reasons for such release, and to
whom, and with a copy of the records to be released to the student’s parents
and the student if desired by the parents, or
(B) except as provided in paragraph (1)(J), such
information is furnished in compliance with judicial order, or pursuant to any
lawfully issued subpoena, upon condition that parents and the students are notified
of all such orders or subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the
educational institution or agency.
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall
preclude authorized representatives of (A) the Comptroller General of the
United States, (B) the Secretary, or © State educational authorities from
having access to student or other records which may be necessary in connection
with the audit and evaluation of Federally-supported education programs, or in
connection with the enforcement of the Federal legal requirements which relate
to such programs: Provided, That except when collection of personally
identifiable information is specifically authorized by Federal law, any data
collected by such officials shall be protected in a manner which will not
permit the personal identification of students and their parents by other than
those officials, and such personally identifiable data shall be destroyed when
no longer needed for such audit, evaluation, and enforcement of Federal legal
requirements.
(4)
(A) Each educational agency or institution shall
maintain a record, kept with the education records of each student, which will
indicate all individuals (other than those specified in paragraph (1)(A) of
this subsection), agencies, or organizations which have requested or obtained
access to a student’s education records maintained by such educational agency
or institution, and which will indicate specifically the legitimate interest
that each such person, agency, or organization has in obtaining this information.
Such record of access shall be available only to parents, to the school
official and his assistants who are responsible for the custody of such
records, and to persons or organizations authorized in, and under the
conditions of, clauses (A) and (C) of paragraph (1) as a means of auditing the
operation of the system.
(B) With respect to this subsection, personal
information shall only be transferred to a third party on the condition that
such party will not permit any other party to have access to such information
without the written consent of the parents of the student. If a third party
outside the educational agency or institution permits access to information in
violation of paragraph (2)(A), or fails to destroy information in violation of
paragraph (1)(F), the educational agency or institution shall be prohibited
from permitting access to information from education records to that third
party for a period of not less than five years.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit State and local educational officials from having access to student or
other records which may be necessary in connection with the audit and
evaluation of any federally or State supported education program or in
connection with the enforcement of the Federal legal requirements which relate
to any such program, subject to the conditions specified in the proviso in
paragraph (3).
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing, to an
alleged victim of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16
of title 18), the results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such
institution against the alleged perpetrator of such crime with respect to such
crime.
(c) Surveys
or data-gathering activities; regulations Not later than 240 days after October
20, 1994, the Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations or procedures, or
identify existing regulations or procedures, which protect the rights of
privacy of students and their families in connection with any surveys or
data-gathering activities conducted, assisted, or authorized by the Secretary
or an administrative head of an education agency. Regulations established under
this subsection shall include provisions controlling the use, dissemination,
and protection of such data. No survey or data-gathering activities shall be
conducted by the Secretary, or an administrative head of an education agency
under an applicable program, unless such activities are authorized by law.
(d) Students’
rather than parents’ permission or consent For the purposes of this section,
whenever a student has attained eighteen years of age, or is attending an
institution of postsecondary education, the permission or consent required of
and the rights accorded to the parents of the student shall thereafter only be
required of and accorded to the student.
(e) Informing
parents or students of rights under this section No funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution
unless such agency or institution effectively informs the parents of students,
or the students, if they are eighteen years of age or older, or are attending
an institution of postsecondary education, of the rights accorded them by this
section.
(f) Enforcement;
termination of assistance
The Secretary shall take
appropriate actions to enforce this section and to deal with violations of this
section, in accordance with this chapter, except that action to terminate
assistance may be taken only if the Secretary finds there has been a failure to
comply with this section, and he has determined that compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means.
(g) Office
and review board; creation; functions The Secretary shall establish or
designate an office and review board within the Department for the purpose of
investigating, processing, reviewing, and adjudicating violations of this
section and complaints which may be filed concerning alleged violations of this
section. Except for the conduct of hearings, none of the functions of the
Secretary under this section shall be carried out in any of the regional
offices of such Department.
(h) Disciplinary
records; disclosure
Nothing in this section
shall prohibit an educational agency or institution
from -
(1) including
appropriate information in the education record of any student concerning
disciplinary action taken against such student for conduct that posed a
significant risk to the safety or well-being of that student, other students,
or other members of the school community; or
(2) disclosing
such information to teachers and school officials, including teachers and
school officials in other schools, who have legitimate educational interests in
the behavior of the student.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
[1] So in original. The period probably should be a
semicolon.
Father custody - state by state
The last complete census (1990) found an interesting state mixture of
single-parent custody patterns. Overall, males headed single-parent families
17.9% of the time, with Asian-Pacific Islander fathers, Hispanic fathers, and
Native American fathers taking the lead.
In most states, Hispanic fathers take a substantial lead over 2nd
place, white fathers, accounting for 1/4 to over 1/3 of the single-family
Hispanic homes in many states. Black fathers are least likely to head a
single-parent family in almost every state. In Arkansas, as example, only 8.1%
of single-parent families are headed by a black father.
A 1999 Census Bureau study found almost 5.5 million children living with
grandparents (7.7 percent of all children) in the United States, were living in
homes with one or both grandparents in 1997.
To find the total number of single-parent homes and the custody pattern in your
state, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/
For an explanation of the terminology used in the above study, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/Library_MHN.htm#familystructure
To view family structure, age of child, education, and income, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/Census
To read the press release about grandparent-headed homes, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/brief_cb99115.html
To read the complete grandparent report, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/p23-198.pdf
To read other reports on fathers, parenting, and child support, go to:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/Library_MHN.htm#socialscience
1990 Census - Children Living in Married and Single-parent Families
State Race Male Headed w/<18
U.S. 17.9%
U.S. White: 20.8%
U.S. Black: 10.3%
U.S. Hispanic: 22.4%
U.S. AI-E-A: 21.5%
U.S. A-PI: 22.9%
U.S. Other: 22.7%
1990 Census - State Data - Children Living in Married and Single-parent
Families
State Race Male Headed w/<18
Alabama 13.5%
Alabama Black: 8.3%
Alabama Hispanic: 26.4%
Alaska 26.6%
Alaska Hispanic 28.0%
Arizona 22.6%
Arizona Hispanic: 26.4%
Arizona Other: 26.3%
Arkansas 15.9%
Arkansas White: 20.8%
Arkansas Black: 8.1%
California 23.3%
California Hispanic: 29.1%
Colorado 19.4%
Colorado White: 20.4%
Connecticut 14.6%
Connecticut White: 17.2%
Connecticut Black: 9.3%
Delaware 18.8%
Dist. Columbia 11.3%
Dist. Columbia Hispanic: 26.0%
Florida 19.2%
Florida Hispanic: 24.9%
Georgia 14.4%
Georgia Hispanic: 23.7%
Hawaii 25.1%
Hawaii Black: 27.6%
Idaho 23.7%
Idaho Hispanic: 29.3%
Illinois 16.2%
Illinois Hispanic: 25.6%
Indiana 18.6%
Indiana Hispanic: 21.4%
Iowa 18.7%
Iowa Black: 9.6%
Iowa Hispanic: 20.8%
Kansas 19.0%
Kansas Hispanic: 27.8%
Kentucky 16.1%
Kentucky Hispanic: 22.0%
Louisiana 14.1%
Louisiana Black: 9.6%
Louisiana Hispanic: 24.9%
Maine 20.6%
Maine Hispanic: 38.8%
Maryland 17.1%
Maryland Hispanic: 26.7%
Massachusetts 13.1%
Massachusetts White: 14.1%
Michigan 15.2%
Minnesota 19.4%
Minnesota Hispanic: 21.2%
Mississippi 13.4%
Mississippi White: 21.3%
Missouri 16.5%
Missouri White: 19.9%
Montana 21.6%
Montana White: 21.8%
Montana Black: 18.8%
Montana Hispanic: 20.6%
Montana AI-E-A: 20.5%
Nebraska 18.0%
Nebraska Hispanic: 21.6%
Nevada 25.3%
Nevada Hispanic: 36.8%
New Hampshire 22.9%
New Hampshire Hispanic: 23.8%
New Jersey 17.5%
New Jersey A-PI: 28.7%
New Mexico 25.9%
New Mexico White: 24.5%
New Mexico Black: 23.1%
New Mexico Hispanic: 25.9%
New Mexico AI-E-A: 32.2%
New Mexico Other: 26.5%
New York 15.0%
New York A-PI: 23.7%
North Carolina 16.1%
North Carolina Hispanic: 26.4%
North Dakota 19.0%
North Dakota White: 19.0%
North Dakota Hispanic: 2.0%
Ohio 15.9%
Ohio White: 18.9%
Oklahoma 17.6%
Oklahoma Hispanic: 27.9%
Oregon 23.7%
Oregon Hispanic: 31.6%
Pennsylvania 17.9%
Pennsylvania White: 20.6%
Rhode Island 15.8%
Rhode Island Hispanic: 17.2%
South Carolina 15.0%
South Carolina White: 22.0%
South Carolina Black: 9.1%
South Carolina Hispanic: 22.0%
South Dakota 20.4%
South Dakota Black: 31.6%
Tennessee 15.1%
Tennessee White: 19.9%
Tennessee Black: 8.0%
Texas 17.9%
Texas Hispanic: 20.2%
Utah 18.1%
Utah Black: 30.4%
Vermont 14.2%
Vermont Black: 20.6%
Virginia 17.4%
Virginia Hispanic: 29.2%
Washington 21.7%
Washington Hispanic: 26.9%
West Virginia 18.8%
West Virginia White: 19.6%
West Virginia Hispanic: 8.0%
Wisconsin 17.7%
Wisconsin White: 20.6%
Wisconsin Black: 7.1%
Wyoming 23.0%
Wyoming Hispanic: 23.8%
= = = = =
Want the latest information on men's health?
Sign up for the Health Issues mailing list at:
http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/healthmail.html
= = = = =
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www.menshealthnetwork.org
info@menshealthnetwork.org
To join the prostate stamp discussion group, send an e-mail to
stamp@menshealthnetwork.org
STATUTES FOR PA ON ISSUES OF
DENIAL OF ACCESS OF CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN
PENNSYLVANIA
STATUTES
TITLE 23. DOMESTIC RELATIONS PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES PART V.
SUPPORT, PROPERTY AND CONTRACTS CHAPTER 43. SUPPORT MATTERS GENERALLY
[Pa.C.S.] @ 4346. Contempt for noncompliance with visitation or partial custody
order
(A) GENERAL RULE. -- A party who willfully fails to comply with any visitation
or partial custody order may, as prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in
contempt. Contempt shall be punishable by any one or more of the following:
(1) Imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months.
(2) A fine not to exceed $ 500.
(3) Probation for a period not to exceed six months.
(4) An order for nonrenewal, suspension or denial of operating privilege
pursuant to section 4355 (relating to denial or suspension of licenses).
(B) CONDITION FOR RELEASE. -- An order
committing a person to jail under this section shall specify the
condition which, when fulfilled, will result in the release of the obligor.
(B) CONDITION FOR RELEASE. -- An order committing a person to jail under this
section shall specify the condition which, when fulfilled, will result in the
release of the obligor.
TITLE 23. DOMESTIC RELATIONS PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES PART V.
SUPPORT, PROPERTY AND CONTRACTS CHAPTER 43. SUPPORT MATTERS GENERALLY
SUBCHAPTER C. PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY
23 Pa.C.S. @ 4355 (1999)
[Pa.C.S.] @ 4355. Denial or suspension of licenses
(A) GENERAL RULE. -- Except as provided in subsection (d.1), where the domestic
relations section or the department has been unable to attach the
income of an obligor and the obligor owes support in an amount equal to or
greater than three months of the monthly support obligation or where an
individual has failed to comply with a visitation or partial custody order
pursuant to section 4346 (relating to contempt for noncompliance with
visitation or partial custody order) or an individual has failed, after
appropriate notice, to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity
or child support proceedings, the court, the domestic relations section or the
department shall issue an order directing any licensing authority to:
(1) prohibit the issuance or renewal of a license of the obligor or other
individual; or
(2) require the suspension of the license of the obligor or other individual.
(B) NOTICE TO OBLIGOR OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL. -
(1) Prior to the issuance of an order to suspend, nonrenew or deny a license,
the obligor or other individual shall be given advance notice.
The notice shall specify:
(i) The amount of arrears owed, if applicable.
(ii) How, when and where the notice can be contested.
(iii) That the grounds for contesting the notice shall be limited to mistakes
of fact. Mistakes of fact shall be limited to errors in the amount of arrears
owed or mistaken identity of the obligor.
(iv) That an order to the licensing authority to automatically suspend,
nonrenew or deny the license will occur in all cases 30 days after issuance of
the notice unless the arrearage is paid, a periodic
payment schedule is approved by the court or the individual is excused from the
failure to comply with the warrant or subpoena.
(2) The Supreme Court shall by general rule provide a procedure for the court
or disciplinary board to deny, suspend or not renew the license of an attorney
who owes past due support in a manner comparable to the
procedures set forth in this section.
(C) ORDER. --
(1) Thirty days after the issuance of the notice, if the obligor has not paid
the arrearage, entered into a court-approved periodic payment schedule or, if
applicable, the obligor or other individual has not
been excused from complying with the warrant or subpoena, the court, the
domestic relations section or department shall direct or cause an order to be
issued to the licensing authority to suspend or deny the
issuance or renewal of a license. Upon receipt, the licensing
authority shall immediately comply with the order or directive. The
licensing authority shall have no authority to stay implementation of
the order or to hold a hearing except in cases of mistaken identity.
(2) An order providing for a periodic payment schedule shall also provide that
failure to comply with the schedule shall result in the immediate suspension,
nonrenewal or denial of the obligor's license.
(3) Subject to section 4377(c) (relating to appeals), to contest the order, the
obligor or other individual must appear before the domestic relations section
not later than ten days after issuance of the order.
The grounds for contesting shall be limited to mistakes of fact. If, as determined by the domestic relations
section, a mistake of fact has occurred, the action shall be modified
accordingly within ten days.
(D) REINSTATEMENT OR ISSUANCE OF LICENSE. -- Where an order or directive has
been issued pursuant to subsection (c) and the obligor has satisfied the
arrearage or entered into a court approved payment plan or, if applicable, the
obligor or other individual has been excused from the failure to comply with
the subpoena or warrant, the court, the domestic relations section or the
department shall order or direct the licensing authority to reinstate or issue
the license to the obligor or other individual. Upon receipt of the order, the
licensing authority shall reinstate or issue the license immediately, provided
that the obligor or other individual meets any and all other requirements for
issuance or reinstatement.
(D.1) SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR OPERATING PRIVILEGE. --
(1) Where the domestic relations section or the department has been unable to
attach the income of an obligor and the obligor owes support in an amount equal
to or greater than three months of the monthly
support obligation or where an individual has failed, after appropriate notice,
to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support
proceedings, the court, the domestic relations section or the department may
issue an order directing the Department of Transportation to:
(i) prohibit the issuance or renewal of a license of the obligor or other
individual; or
(ii) require the suspension of the license of the obligor or other individual.
(2) Prior to the issuance of an order to suspend, nonrenew or deny a license,
the obligor or other individual shall be given advance notice.
The notice shall specify:
(i) The amount of arrears owed, if applicable.
(ii) How, when and where the notice can be contested.
(iii) That the grounds for contesting the notice shall be limited to mistakes
of fact. Mistakes of fact shall be limited to errors in the amount of arrears
owed or mistaken identity of the obligor.
(iv) That an order to the Department of Transportation to automatically
suspend, nonrenew or deny the license will occur in all cases 30 days after
issuance of the notice unless the arrearage is paid, a periodic payment
schedule is approved by the court or the
individual is excused from the failure to comply with the warrant or subpoena.
(3) Any order issued to the Department of Transportation pursuant to this
section shall be issued as agreed upon by the department and the
Department of Transportation. The order may be transmitted electronically or by
other methods.
(4) Upon receipt of an order or directive from a court, the domestic relations
section or the department authorizing the Department of Transportation to
suspend the operating privilege of an obligor or other individual, the
Department of Transportation shall immediately suspend the operating privilege
of that obligor or other individual.
Upon receipt of an order from the court or the domestic relations
section or a directive from the department authorizing the Department of
Transportation to restore the operating privilege of an obligor or other
individual, the Department of Transportation shall immediately restore the
operating privilege of that obligor or other individual if the person complies
with the provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. @ 1960 (relating to reinstatement of
operating privilege or vehicle registration).
(5) An insurer may not increase premiums, impose a surcharge or rate penalty,
make a driver record point assignment for automobile insurance or cancel or
refuse to renew an automobile insurance policy on account of a suspension under
this section.
(6) There shall be no right to appeal from a suspension under this section
pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. @ 1550 (relating to judicial review). Subject to section 4377(c) (relating to
power to expedite support cases), the sole remedy shall be to petition the court
which entered
the underlying support order resulting in the suspension, revocation or refusal
to issue or renew the license.
(D.2) SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR RECREATIONAL LICENSES ISSUED BY PENNSYLVANIA GAME
COMMISSION. --
(1) Where the domestic relations section or the department has been unable to
attach the income of an obligor and the obligor owes support in an amount equal
to or greater than three months of the monthly
support obligation or where an individual has failed, after appropriate notice,
to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support
proceedings, the court may issue an order directing the Pennsylvania Game
Commission to prohibit the issuance or renewal of a recreational license of the
obligor or other individual or to require the suspension of the recreational
license of the obligor or other individual.
(2) Procedures for notice of suspension, nonrenewal or denial, issuance of the
appropriate order and reinstatement of a recreational license shall be in
accordance with subsections (b), (c) and (d).
(3) Upon receipt of an order from a court requiring the Pennsylvania Game
Commission to refuse to issue or renew or to revoke or suspend the recreational
license of the obligor or other individual, the Pennsylvania Game Commission
shall immediately comply with the order.
CHAPTER 53. CUSTODY SUBCHAPTER B. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
[Pa.C.S.] @ 5356. Filing and
enforcement of custody decree of another state
(A) GENERAL RULE. -- A certified copy of a custody decree of another state
whose decrees are recognized under section 5354 (relating to recognition of
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this
Commonwealth.
(B) COSTS AND EXPENSES. -- A person violating a custody decree of another state
which makes it necessary to enforce the decree in this Commonwealth may be
required to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred by the party entitled to the custody or his witnesses.
Forwarded from our friend, Dr. Bob Fink of Northern California.
An article from a Self-Help Newsletter:
Family Man
by Ron Huxley, LMFT
Fathers have been called a "biological necessity, but a
social accident." Some call us "dead beats" or "good for
nothing." Given the problem society has had with absent fathers
(emotionally and physically) I can see why. But not every one sees fathers as
second-rate parents. More positive descriptions include: "protector,
supporter, provider and even nurturer."
Way back in the Garden of Eden, man and woman were commanded to share the
parenting responsibilities and be joint caretakers of their family. When God
said, "to be fruitful and multiply" he wasn't speaking only to the
man and directing him to be "biological necessity" for
reproduction. He has a part to play in
the family. A very important one.
Unfortunately, many children today only get to experience one side of
that divine commandment as seen in the single parent statistical climb.
Daddy Hunger
The fallout of this reality, for children, is "daddy hunger." I see this everyday in my practice as a
child therapist. Daddy hunger refers to unconscious craving of a child for male
connection. Unfortunately, as the song about "finding love in all the
wrong places" says, children may try and feed that hunger in unhealthy
ways. And when they do get attention in unhealthy ways, they are left feeling
as hungry, if not more, than before. What they got wasn't true fathering.
Fatherless children and children of abusive fathers, want a positive
relationship with a man. In fact, they need it to become capable parents
themselves some day. It is hard to parent when you haven't had good examples in
your life. That's why some of the best therapy I have done has nothing to do
with my clinical wizardry. It simply has to do with the fact that I am male.
Even some women, who have had terrible relationships with men, come to see me
because I am male. If they are sincere,
they can work on some very important
relationship issues with me, by virtue of my being male, that they might not be
able to do with a woman therapist.
In addition to acting as a healthy dad-object to my child clients, I take pride
in being a dad to my own children.
Being a dad is one of the toughest and most rewarding jobs I have
experienced. I should know. I have been a traditional two-parent father,
divorced father, single father, and now a stepfather of four hormone raging,
brain cell disappearing, teenage children. That's right, four at one time. The
key to keeping my sanity is commitment. If I went with my emotions -- well,
let's just say that it wouldn't be a pretty picture. Maybe that is why so many
dads are absent, emotionally or physically. They don't know how to handle their
emotions. Or they think that parenting is about handling their emotions. Either
way, you are bound
to lose, regardless of your gender.
Concrete Commitment
Parenting is a choice. I choose to love my children,
biological and nonbiological. To be a family man, a
profession of commitment must be made to your partner and your children. And I
mean it in that order. Partner first.
Children second. And this goes double for step or blended families. I
know it's not what you have been told but don't believe everything you hear
(except from me, of course). In nontraditional families parents tend to lean in
the direction of their biological children. It's like a magnet; formed at the
moment you witnessed their birth, that pulls you together. Acknowledge that pull as healthy but don't
let it pull you apart from your partner. That is not healthy.
Children are concrete thinkers. They need to see, hear, feel your commitment.
Write it on a certificate and stick it on the refrigerator door along with the
grocery list and the daily artwork. Talk about it at the dinner table. Show it
in your willingness to show up at their school play or go on the bus for the
school field trip. This can be hard for children of divorce or abusive homes to
trust. And it can be hard to say or do. Get a drink of water to clear your
throat. Practice it in front of the mirror. Write in on your hand. Do whatever
it takes, but say it, with words and actions. After a while, sometimes a long
while, even the most hurting kids will believe it.
A Good Question
A reporter recently asked fathers an important question, on a fathers' online
discussion list, of which I am a member.
He wanted to know what we thought was the biggest change for fathers in
the last 100 years. Well, that's a big question but I wrote back that a
revolution is taking place in society around the concept of fathering. Fathers
are tearing down stereotyped images of fatherhood. Some are doing this in a
very proactive, legislative fashion. Others, the quiet majority, are simply
doing what God asked them to do way back when. Be involved.
Father's roles are changing. Many dads are staying home and taking care of the
children while mom works. Many are becoming single dads and fighting for time
with their children instead of giving up and the courts are staring to listen.
Others are taking advantage of the new technology to work at home to be more
involved. And some corporations are allowing dads to work more flexible hours
so fathers can see their child dressed up as a shepherd, in the Christmas play.
That's why I think my rally cry for fathers in the new millennium will be:
"Be committed. Be involved. Be a
social necessity." In other words, be a family man!
References:
Shapiro, Jerrold L. "The Measure of a Man: Becoming the Father You Wish
Your Father Had Been." New York: Perigee Book. 1993
Huxley, Ronald "Love & Limits: Achieving a Balance in
Parenting." San Diego: Singular Publishing Group, Inc. 1998
Ron Huxley, LMFT is a licensed child therapist and the
author of the book, "Love & Limits: Achieving a Balance in
Parenting." His articles have appeared in numerous online magazines and he
is a regular columnist for the Recovery Journal.
Copyright 1994-2000 by Pioneer Development Resources, Inc. Permission is granted to reproduce or
distribute this newsletter, provided copyright is acknowledged.
**********************************************
Robert A. Fink, M. D., F.A.C.S., P. C.
2500 Milvia Street Suite 222
Berkeley, California 94704-2636
Telephone: 510-849-2555 FAX: 510-849-2557
WWW: http://www.dovecom.com/rafink/
mailto:rafink@ibm.net
